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The statute under which that judg- dissented, chiefly on the ground
ment was recovered was not . . .. that "It was for the Maryland
a penal law, in the international
court to determine whether such
sense. The faith and credit, force
enforcement would . . . involve
and effect, which that judgment
the execution of the penal laws of
had by law and usage in New York
another State, afid although it
was to be conclusive evidence of a
might have mistaken in the concludirect civil liability from the indi- sion arrived at, such error does
vidual defendant to the individual not give this court jurisdiction
plaintiff fora certain sum of money,
to review its judgment."
The
and a debt of record, on which an
learied Chief Justice thought
action would lie, as on any other
that 'full faith and credit were accivil judgment interparlies. The
'corded to the judgment as matter
court of appeals of Maryland, there- of evidence ' and that 'no Federal
fore, in deciding this case against
question was involved.'
the plaintiff, upon the ground that
It might be interesting to specuthe judgment was not one which it late upon the future attitude of the
was bound in any manner to en- State courts, under different cirforce, denied to the judgment the
cumstances, in view of this impor-'
full faith credit and effect to
tant decision; but this note has
already exceeded the customary
which it was entitled under the
Constitution and lavs of the United
limit in the effort to present the
States."
situation fully and clearly and in
LAMAR and SHIRAS, JJ., were
the language of the different courts.
not on the bench and took no part
A. U. BANNARD.
in the decision. FULLER, C. J.,

EDITORIAL NOTES.
By W. D. L.

CIVIL LIBERTY AS WRITTEN IN THE CONSTITUTION.

II.
How Far Civil Liberty was Thought, Prior to zSz6, to be
Secured in Written Constitutions.
IN our editorial notes for August we tried to point out
that the great constitutional questions which would attract
the attention of courts, bar and laity for a considerable
time, were not those concerning the proper division of
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State and ederal .power, but questions concerning the
civil liberty of the individual. That is to say, how far our
,written constitution marks out for the individual, or domain
6f individual freedom, and if so, by what principles shall
we draw the boundaries of this domain.

"
:

We also tried to

point out that already there had appeared those whom we
might call strict constructionalists, -i.e., those who would confine the domain of civil liberty to the express exemptions
from the power of government in the written constitution,
narrowly construed; while others would only give to a
legis'lature created by a constitution such power as was
expressly, or by necessary implication, granted, withholding all'power that disregarded the fundamental principles
of civil liberty as shadowed forth in such great documents
of the English speaking race as Magna Charta and the
Declaration of Independence.

'To the former of these belongs Mr. McMuRTRuE, whose
articles in Tim AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND REVIEW1
called forth these hotes.
It is assumed, in these interesting and forcible articles,
that the idea that a State constitution does not confer on a
State legislature all power not expressly withheld, is "A
Modem Canon of Constitutional Law." It is, the correctness of this statement which we now desire to-examine.
* The best way to do this is to see if we can find any
opnions expressed previously to z816, showing that the
legislaturecould not piass laws contrary to the fundamental
prinz.les of naturaljustice, unleis express wdrrantfor the
* same was found in the constitution.

It is most surprising, in view of the fact that later
judges seem to have generally held the opposite view, that
the opinion that a State legislature could not pass a law
against what was called natural justice, unless expressly
authorized by the constitution, was held, almost universally, during the last part of the eighteenth, and the beginning of the present century. The French Revolution,
and its half-sublime, half-ridiculous ideas onithe rights of
I Supra, January number,

p. i, and Comments in the june number.
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man, and the prevalent twaddle concerning 'social compacts," was partly responsible for this. Therefore, in re-viewing opinions written at that time, we would caution the
reader to remember, that in spite of bad logic, and essays
-concerning the "nature of the social compact," which fill
the opinions of the courts, as it does all the writings of
the wisest of the time, this, however distasteful, is no
valid reason why the belief that a State constitution is a
limited grant of power may not be sound.
In October, 1789, the cage of Hain v. McClaws and
wife," came before the Superior Court of South Carolina. '
An act of the State, passed in 1789, provided that negroes
could be brought. into the State by actual settlers. In view
of this act the defendants started from Havana for South
Carolina with their negroes. While on their way an act
was passed by the State legislature forfeiting all negroes
hereafter brought into the State, not excepting those accompanying actual settlers. The question before the court was
-whether the negroes accompanying the plaintiff were forfeited. The Court decide& that the legislature never meant
to apply the law to such a case. But the attitude in which
the three members of the court regarded the powers of the
legislature is clearly shown in the following sentence:

2

"It

is clear, that statutes passed against the plain and obvious
principles of common right, and common reason, are absolutely null and void, so far as they are calculated to operate
against those principles.

.

.

We are bound to give

-such a construction to the Act of 1789 as will be consistent
with justice, and the doctrine of natural reason, though
contrary to the strict letter of the law."
Before this MADISON had written in the Federalist,concerning Bills of Attainder, ex fiost facto laws, and laws
impairing the obligation of contract, that they are "contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to
,every principle of sound legislation. The two former are
'I

2

Bay, 93.

'P. 98.
3 No. 44, P. MI2.
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expressly prohibited by ihe declarations prefixed to some
. of the State donstitutions, and all ofthem arefrohibitedby
the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. It is
.true that when this was written, the proposition contained
in Malbury v. Madison,' that a Court could declare an act
not warranted by the constitution void, was certainly not
generally recognized, but it is easy to see that had he once
recognized this principle, MADISON, as a judge, would have

declared an exfpost facto law void, because contrary to the
spirit of a free government, though no express prohibition
could be found in the Constitution of the United States or
of the State.
, In Pennsylvania, in 1795, Mr. Justice PATTERSON told
the jury, in the case of Vanhorn's Lessee v. Dorrance, ' that
the act of the State commonly called the "regulating and con.'erringact," which attempted, without just compensation, to
take the property of the plaintiffand give it to the defendant,
was unconstitutional. From the usual general expressions.
of the bill of rights the judge draws the conclusion, "that
the right of acquiring and possessing property, and havingit protected, is one of the natural, inherent and unalienable
rights." From the whole tenor of his address it is clear
that his decision would have been the same had the bill of
rights been entirely absent from the constitution of the
State. Of the constitution he says: "It is the form of
government delineated by the mighty hand of the people,
in which certain fixed principles of fundamental laws are
established." And he adds, "What are the legislatures ?
Creatures of the constitution. They owe their existence.
to the constitution ; they derive their powers from the
constitution.

The preservation of property is

the primary object of the social compact, and by the lateconstitution of Pennsylvania was made a fundamental law.
The legislature, therefore, had no authority to.
make an act, divesting -one citizen of his freehold and'Cr.,

137 (803).
2 Dal., 304.
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vesting it in another, without just compensation
it is contrary to the letter and spirit of the constitution."
Turning to the Supreme Court of the United States,
we find this subject first discussed in Calder v. Bull.1
The State"of Connecticut had passed a law granting a new
hearing in the case of a suit involving the validity of a
will. The decree of the Court had been made, but the
property not actually in the possession of the successful
parties at the time the act -was passed. The Supreme
Court held, that inasmuch as the property had not come
into the -possession of the successful parties in the, first
suit, at the time of the passage of the act, no rights
vested 1had been divested, and the act was constitutional.But Mr. Justice CHASE, in discussing the question
whether a State legislature, not expressly restrained by the
State constitution, can revise a decision of any of its courts'
of justice, says': f"I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of
a State legislature

.

.

although its authority should

.

not be expressly restrained by the constitution, or fundamental law of the State. The people of the United States
erected their governments

.

.

.

to establish justice, to

promote the general welfare, to secure the blessingt of
liberty; and to protect their persons and property from
violence.

.

.

.

There are acts which our federal or

State legislatures cannot do without qxceeding their au-.'
thority. There are certain vital principles to otir free
Republican governments, which determine and overrule
any apparent flagrant abuse of legislative power: as to
authorize any manifest injustice by positive law ;'or to take
away the fight of personal liberty, or private property, for
the protection whereof government was established .
a law that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in
other words, for an act which when done was in violation
of no existing law, a law that destroys or impairs the lawful
private contracts of citizens, a law that makes a man a
judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from
A. and gives it to B. It is against reason and justice for a
13 Dall., 386 (1798).
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people to entrust a legislature with such powers, and, therefore, they will not be presumed to have done it. The
origin, the nature, the spirit, of our own State governments amount to a, prohibition on such acts of legislation;
and the general principles of law and reason forbid them.
*Thelegislature may enjoin, forbid, permit and punish; and
*may declare new crimes, aid may establish rules of conduct
for all its citizens in future cases ; they may commend what
is right, and prohibit what is wrong; they cannot change
'innocence into guilt, or punish innocence as a crime, or
violate the right of antecedent lawful private contract; or
the right of private property. To maintain that our federal
or State legislatures possess such powers, if they are not
excyiressly restrained would, in my opinion, be a political
heresy, altogether indefensible in our free republican
governments. . . . The prohibition against their (the
States) making any ex post facto law was introduced for

greater caution."'
To show how universal was the opinion that a State
legislature was bound by certain "generalandfundamental
prenciles of all free governments," in the case of Ogden

v. Blackledge, also in the Supreme Court of the United
States, Mr. MARTIN was stopped by the Court, when he
was about to argue that a retrogressive act, declaring what
the law had been, was contrary to "the fundamental principles of all our governments," and therefore, unconstitutional, the Court saying : "It was unnecessary to argue on
that point." ' But, perhaps, one of the most brilliant arguments in favor of considering powers of legislation, withheld from a body called into being by a constitution, except
where .expressly conferred, is found in the speech of Mr.
HAYWOOD, in the case of Trustees of University v. Foy,
before the Court of Conference, in North Carolina.' There
the State, by the Act of 1789, had vested in the University
I See a further discussion

of this.

2 Cr., 272 (1804).
3 P. 277.
4 Murphy (N. C.), 58 (1805).
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Corporation all the lands which had, or would thereafter
escheat to the State. In 8oo the legisiature repealed this*
act, and declared that, all land received by -the'University
under the prior act, and not disposed of to .bona fide
purchasers, should revert to State. Mr. HAYWOOD, speak-.
ing of the inviolability of private property, and the powkers
of the legislature to violate it-and here he strikes the key-.
note of his position-said : "Upon what occasion was 'i ",
that the people clothed them with a decision so fatal tc
"Is the act justified by anything"
their dearest interest?"
in the constitution?" and thei

he points out that so far

from being justified it is impliedly prohibited by the'tenth
section of the Bill of Rights. . The point which we wish .
to illustrate is that he argued the case on the dssumptl'ii"'.
that the legislature had lo point to some dlause in, the...
constitution of the State, for any power which gave them
the right to confiscate private property without compensa"
tion.'
Carrying out the same thought Judge. PA1RZR, iii
Ellis v. Marshall,' a case where* the question was whether
the defendant could be made a member-of a corporationby the State legislature against his will, says: "No "apph
hension exists that the legislature has such power."
One also has 'the great, Chief Justice himself as, :his-.
authority for this way of regarding the powers granted -byf(,
constitutions to legislatures. If we turn to his opinion -',.,
Fletcher v. Peck.3 we find that in discussing the qtiestion whether a State legislature can annul its grants; he divites. :
the argument into two parts : First, that a State legisla-'"
-

The opinion of the Court in this case is most unsatisfactory. They
decided the controversy in favor of the University on the ground that the"
constitution having directed the legislature to create a University, its..
creation was the creation of th7 constitution, -and, therefore, the la'd.,
could not be taken'away. Where Judge LocK found a basis for the conclusion in the premises it is hard to say. HAL,, J., with much more reat .
son, argues that, as a result of this article in the co'nstitutdon, the Univer-sity corporation was public, and its officers, the officers of the State, and,.
therefore, the State could take away its funds as much as it pleased.
2 Mass., 269 (1807). "

3 Cr., 87-(i810).
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2 ture cannot do this even if it wa not expressly restrained
by the Constitution of the United States or of the States.
Secondly, a State is expressly restrained by the clause forbidding any impairment of the obligations of contracts.
The first part of the argument is that which is at present
interesting to us. He points out that the power of taking
property already vested is not a legislative power, and then
he adds: "If the legislature of Georgia . . . might
claim to itself the power of judging in its own case, yet
there are certain great principles of justice, whose authority
,isuniversally acknowledged, that ought not to be entirely
disregarded.
.
.
The principle (contended for) is this:
That a legislature may, by its own act, divest the vested
estate of any man whatsoever, for reasons which shall by
A proposition for which the
.itself be deemed sufficient."
judge has little sympathy. He says: "It may -well be
doubted whether the nature of society and of government
does not prescribe some limits to th 4 legislative power;
and if any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the
property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired,
may be seized without compensation? . . . The validity of this rescinding act may well be doubted were Georgia a single sovereign power."
It was not necessary for Chief Justice MARSHALL to
rest his decision solely on the spirit of the constitution, and
the "fundamental principles of a free government," but
from these expressions one can have no doubt that, had he
entertained the same idea as Mr. justice JOHNSON concerning the scope of the prohibition on the States to impair the
obligations of contracts, he would, as did that Judge, still
have held the act of the State unconstitutional.
Speaking of Mr. Justice JOHNSON, his opinion is very
"I did not hesitate to declare," he says,
pronounced.
"that a State does not possess the power of revoking its
own grants; but I do so on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things; a principle which would impose
laws even on the deity."
The great Chancellor, KENT, was also very far from
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Tegarding (as his opinion. in Dbsh v. Van Kleich,' very
plainly shows) a State constitution as-granting to the legislature every power that was not expressly retained. This
case was.one in which it was attempted to apply a statute,
which construed a prior act differently than it had been'
construed by the Court, to a case arising before the explaining statute. The judges were evenly divided in opinion.
Chancellor KENT took the view that the statute was not
meant to apply to the cases arising before the statute, but,'.
he leaves no doubt on our mind that, irrespective of express
constitutional restrictions, he would have declared such an
act unconstitutional. "Our constitutions," we read, "do
not admit the power assumed by the Roman Prince (iMlerloatisfprinifiis),and the principle we are considering (no re-.',
troactive laws) is now to be considered sacred. It is inot/re- -.
tended ihat we have any extress constitutionalfirovisions on
1he subject; nor have we any for numerous other rights
dear alike to freedom and to justice." Mr. Justice STORY,
in Society v. Wheeler,' a case which was argued on express
prohibitions regarding retrogressive acts in the constitution
of New Hampshire, speaking of this opinion of Chancellor,
KENT, says: "In a fit case depending upon elementary
principles, I should be disposed lo go a great way with the"
learned argument."
That his own opinions were similar .,,
to those of the Chancellor we clearly see from thf case of'.
Terret v. Taylor,3 in which he delivered the judgment 6f
the Court. The point in that case was whether the State
could, without compensation, divest the Episcopal Church
of ptoperty vested in it as a corporation. The land happened
to be at the time in the District of Columbia, and naturally
this fact made the case of the State still more impossible,
if that could be, than it would have been had the land been
within Virginia.. Mr. Justice ST6RY, in the course of his
opinion, says: "We have no knowledge of any authority
or principle which would support the doctrine that a legis17 Johns. (N. Y.), 477. (18I).
2 Gals., 103, p. 139 (1814).
3 9 Cr., 45 (18r5).
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lative grant is revokable in its own nature, and held only
de bene ilacito. Such a doctrine would uproot almost all
land titles in Virginia, and is entirely inconsistent with a
great and fundamental principle of a republican government, the right of the citizens to the free enjoyment of
their property legally acquired.

.

.

.

That the legis-

lature can repeal statutes creating private corporations, or
conferring on them property already acquired, and by such
repeal vest the property of such corporations exclusively in
the State

.

.

.

we cannot admit, and we think our-

,selves standing on principles of natural justice, upon the
fundamental laws of every free government, and upon
the. spirit and letter of the Constitution of the United
States." Except in this last sentence, not one word about
any "express" prohibitions.
Of -course, these opinions did not go unchallenged.

Thus, the expressions and some of the arguments of HAYWOOD, in Trustees of University v. Foy,1 are condemned in
the dissent of Judge HALL, and in Dash v. Van Kleich,2 the
case in which Judge KENT delivers his opinion, we find
Judge YATF.* coming to an opposite conclusion, on the
ground that "There is nothing in the State constitution to
prevent legislative interference in judicial construction,"
while Judge SPENSER is practically of the same opinion.
But undoubtedly the quantity and quality of jiudicial
opinion, prior to the days of TANEY, is in favor of what
Mr. McMURTRIE has called a "New Canon of Constitu-

tional Interpretation, 'I viz.: "that a statute interfering with
natural rights must be shown to be authorized, not that it
must be shown to be prohibited."
Why, then, the contrary opinion of a few years back,
which held undisputed sway-that an act of a legislature,
no matter what, must be showi to be expressly prohibited
before it can be declared void.
We believe that the opinions in the Dartmouth College case have much to do with this. Both MARSHIALL and
SToRY base their opinions in that case on the express clause
1 Murphy (N. C.), 58 (i8o5).

2 7 Johns, 477 (181).
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in the Constitution of the United States prohibiting the
States from impairing the obligation of contracts. . Those
who read these opinions are impressed with the idea that
if it were not for this clause the Court would havre held
that the Sfates could trample on all civil rights arising out of.
contracts. They look, as we confess we ourselves first
looked, on Webster's argument, that the.acts of New Hampshire were void, irrespective of any one clause in the Consti-.
tution of the United States,' because "they are not the
exercise of a power properly legislative," as merely used for the purposes of argument, and only meant half seriously.*
Few think that the identical expression was employed in
a similar opinion by the Chief Justice himielf- only a few
years before.
But though this way of regarding civil liberty, and
the constitutions of the State and the United States is not
new, its antiquity does not prove its correctness. -In the
next number, thereforey I shall do my best to deal with
Mr. McMuRTRi's very able arguments, going to show the

folly of putting into the hands of the Court a determination of the question whether a legislative act conforms to /
natural justice, and the extreme improbability of the,
people, ever having intended such a construction to be put'
upon any constitution.
'4 Wh. p. 558.

